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NOTES
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PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY:

SEARCH FOR A CIVIL REMEDY

I. Introduction
The saga of Dr. Sam Sheppard is well known. His conviction, the ensuing
ten years of appeal, and his ultimate acquittal constitute a blemish on the legal
and journalistic professions alike. Soon after Sheppard's release, his renowned
lawyer, F. Lee Bailey, pointedly remarked, "somebody owes Sam something."1
As far as Sheppard is concerned, that "somebody" is clearly the Scripps-Howard
Company, publishers of the Cleveland Press. Sheppard and Bailey have announced plans to sue Scripps-Howard for $122 million
Indeed, it is difficult
for even the staunchest advocate of a free press to deny that some of the articles
that appeared in the Press could have prejudiced the jury that convicted Sheppard.' Unfortunately, however, the common law has never developed a civil
remedy for a private party whose right to a fair and impartial jury trial was
infringed upon by prejudicial pretrial and trial publicity.
In an attempt to solve this problem, this note first investigates the possibility
of finding relief for a victim of prejudicial publicity in one of the civil remedies
presently afforded by the law. Next, the need for the creation of a remedy of
this type is fully explored. Finally, a model statute, designed to meet this need
and to fill the void in the existing law, is proposed.
II.

The Inadequacy of Existing Remedies

A. Tort: Libel and Invasion of Privacy
It is generally accepted that a newspaper publication falsely charging one
with criminal conduct is libelous per se.4 Money damages may be recovered
in a civil suit from the responsible party even without a showing of actual
damage.' In all but ten states, 6 however, truth is an absolute defense to a civil
libel action.' Obviously, it will be a rare case when such inherently prejudicial
I

Time, Dec. 9, 1966, p. 52.

2 Seminar- "Free Press v. Fair Trial," 39 CoNN. B.J. 140, 172-73 (1965).
3 See articles and headlines exhibited in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 44-57
(S.D. Ohio 1964), red, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
4 See, e.g., Marteney v. United Press Assoc., 224 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1955); Rimmer v.
Chadron Printing Co., 156 Neb. 533, 56 N.W.2d 806 (1953) ;Bergmann v. Jacobs, 157 N.Y.S.2d
50 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Knoxville Publishing Co. v. Taylor, 31 Tenn. App. 368, 215 S.W.2d
27 (1948); Davila v. Caller Times Publishing Co., 311 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
5

RESTATEMENT,

TORTS § 621 (1938).

6 In the following ten states truth is a defense only when it is published for good
motives, a justifiable purpose, or both. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3920 (1953); FLA. CONST.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 4; ME. RZV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 152 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 92 (1956); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1582 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-6-9 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 8; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 20.
7 E.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.02 (Page 1953) provides:
In an action for a libel or a slander, the defendant may allege and prove the
truth of the matter charged as defamatory. Proof of the truth thereof shall be a
complete defense. In all such actions any mitigating circumstances may be proved
to reduce damages.
For a history of the truth defense, see Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REv. 43
(1931). For criticism of this defense, see Harnett & Thornton, The Truth Hurts: A Critique
of a Defense to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REv. 425 (1949).
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information as the accused's prior criminal record, his inadmissible confession,
or the results of his lie detector test will not be true, at least in part. Of course,
editorials accusing the defendant of a crime or an article quoting the prosecutor
as saying that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged can only be justified
by proving that the defendant is guilty. It is not a sufficient defense for a newspaper to show that the prosecutor did in fact make such a statement.' But even
in these situations, a newspaper's burden of proof will ordinarily not be insurmountable. When the plaintiff in a libel suit has been convicted at a criminal
trial, the newspaper might be able to introduce this conviction into the civil
proceeding.9 When the defendant has been acquitted at the criminal trial, the
paper is still not precluded from raising truth as a defense." None of the principles of collateral estoppel would apply in this latter case since the newspaper
was not a party to the criminal proceeding. Hence, the Cleveland Press would
be perfectly free to offer proof to a new jury that Sam Sheppard killed his wife.
Significantly, since this would be a civil case, the Press would not have to prove
Sheppard's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but only by a preponderance of
the evidence.11
The unlikelihood of a libel suit providing recovery for an aggrieved criminal
defendant was well summed up in a recent article written by Judge Meyer of
the New York Supreme Court.
[E]xisting correctives "at best only circumvent some consequences of an
achieved obstruction of justice." The right to sue for libel is not a solution,
for it can reach only defamatory publications and may be defended on the
ground of truth or privilege ....1 (Emphasis added.)

Among the many states that recognize the right to privacy, truth is usually
not a defense to a common law action for invasion of privacy."

The fact that

the publication contains information of a "public interest," however, is generally
recognized as a complete bar to recovery;4 and the law considers an accused
defendant, charged with the commission of a crime, to be a newsworthy person. 5 The California Supreme Court has stated: "The facts concerning the
arrest and prosecution of those charged with violation of the law axe matters of
8 PRossxR, LAw OF TORTS 825 (3d ed. 1964).
9 Although a minority view, there isa recognized trend toward allowing a prior criminal conviction to be used as evidence in a civil trial based on the same facts. See UmFORM
RuULES OF EVIDENCE rule 63'(20) (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942) (prior
conviction must be for a felony). Also ifthe criminal defendant takes the stand in the civil
trial, the conviction can be introduced to impeach his character as a witness. MCoRmiCK,
EVmENCE 618 (1954).
10 No similar trend exists toward allowing criminal acquittals to be introduced into the
civil trial. Note, Admissibility and Weight of a Criminal Conviction in a Subsequent Civil
Action, 39 VA. L. Rv. 995 (1953). This seems perfectly sensible considering the greater
burden of proof required in the criminal case.
11 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 613, comment h.
12 Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: The Judge's View, 41 N.D.L. Rlv. 14, 19 n.25 (1964).
13 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 834. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv.L. RaV. 193, 218 (1890).
14 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 8,at 844-50. See generally Note, Right of Privacy vs.
Free Press: Suggested Resolution of Conflicting Values, 28 IND. L.J. 179 '(1953).
15 See, e.g., Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959); Lyles v. State,
330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Grim. App. 1958); McGovern v.Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq. 341, 54 A.2d
469 (1947).
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general public interest. Therefore the publication of details of such official
actions cannot, in the absence of defamatory statements, be actionable."'"
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the scope of these
two torts even further. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Court held
that the first amendment limits a state's power to award damages for libel in
an action brought by a public official against those who falsely criticize his official
conduct. Such statements, under Sullivan, are actionable only if made with
"actual malice" -with knowledge that the statements were false or in reckless
disregard of whether they were true or false.' Commentators have suggested
that the Sullivan rule would not remain limited to public officials.19 This prediction is borne out by the recent decision of the Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill.20
In Hill the Court applied the Sullivan rule to defeat an action brought under
a Nev York privacy statute by a private individual against Life magazine. The
plaintiff claimed that Life had falsely portrayed his family's ordeal at the hands
of a group of escaped convicts. While remanding, the Court stated that a
finding of malice was a necessary. prerequisite for recovery under the New York
statute. It is interesting to note that the Court expressly left open the important
question of whether the Sullivan rule would apply to a libel suit brought by a
private individual.2 Even if the rule were not so extended, these two cases certainly preclude any possibility of expanding either of these torts to encompass
prejudiced criminal defendants.
B. The Civil Rights Statutes
F. Lee Bailey has also mentioned the possibility of bringing suit against
Scripps-Howard under one of the old Federal Civil Rights Statutes. 2 Generally
speaking, these statutes allow a person whose civil rights have been violated to
have a civil damage action against the violator. The actual wording of these
statutes and their judicial interpretation, however, make recovery from a newspaper for violating an accused's right to a fair trial extremely doubtful. Section
1979 of the Revised Statutes does grant an action at law to a person deprived of
any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... ," but it
clearly demands that the person responsible for such a deprivation be acting
"under color of" state law.23
In terms of actual language, section 1980 would seem to offer the best
opportunity for relief. The second part of it reads:
16 Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 323, 239 P.2d 876, 880, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
840 (1952).
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18 Id. at 286.
19 Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation,
49 Com-NLL L.Q. 581, 589 (1964); Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional
Limitations on State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1444 '(1965). See Pauling
v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum), cert. denied, 379 U.S.

968 (1965).
20 87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).

21 Id. at 543-44. The answer may soon come. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351
F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 811 (1966) '(Sullivan rule not applied

in a successful libel suit by a football coach against the Saturday Evening Post).
22 Seminar, supra note 2, at 172.
23 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the
United States from attending such court, . . . or to influence the verdict,
presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such
court

....

24

This part of the statute would have the obvious limitation of applying only to
conspiracies to influence a jury sitting in a federal court. But it further provides:
[O]r if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice
in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws .... 25
The remedy is provided at the end of the third part.
[I]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, . . . the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned26by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Although the express language does not require it, a vast majority of courts
have construed the conspiracy statutes as requiring that at least one of the conspirators be acting "under color of" state law.27 The second part of section
1980 has never been before the Supreme Court, but in Collins v. Hardyman,"
the Court considered the similarly worded third part. The plaintiff in Collins
was ultimately denied relief because he did not show that he had actually been
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The Court emphasized, however,
that if such a showing had been made, serious constitutional questions would
have arisen since the complaint had not alleged the defendants to be acting
under color of state law.29 Justice Jackson emphasized that a criminal statute
"in language indistinguishable from that used to describe civil conspiracies"
had earlier been declared unconstitutional."
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the problem of state
action in statutes of this type is United States v. Guest."' Herbert Guest was
indicted under section 241 of title 18 of the United States Code, which provides
fines and imprisonment for "two or more persons [who] conspire to injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
24 REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985'(2) (1964).
25 Ibid.
26 REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964).

27 See, e.g., Wallach v. Cannon, 357 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1966); Schroeder v. Illinois,
354 F.2d 561, 563 '(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966); Swift v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 563, 566 (M.D. Ga. 1962). For a list of pre-1961 cases holding
state action necessary, see Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 657-58 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
aff'd, 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963).

28 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
29 Id. at 659.

30 Id. at 657. This statute, Rmr.
United States, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
31 383 U.S. 745 '(1966).

STAT.

§ 5519 (1875),

was struck down in Harris v.
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States .... ."" No state action had been alleged in the complaint, but again
the Court avoided direct confrontation with the issue by holding that state action
was present and by remanding the case. Mr. Justice Stewart, however, speaking
for the Court, went on to say "that § 241 by its clear language incorporates no
more than the Equal Protection Clause itself," 3 which he had previously acknowledged as speaking "to the State or to those acting under the color of its
authority."3 4 Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for himself and two others, was
of the opinion that section 241 does reach private conspiracies and is a valid
exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. 3
Assuming then that a suit against a newspaper under the second part of
section 1980 would have to allege state action, one possible theory of recovery
under the statute might still be raised. This is the situation where the published
prejudicial information is released to the press by the police or the prosecutor.
Such a showing might satisfy the state action requirement. Nevertheless, it would
not in itself prove a conspiracy between the newspaper and the prosecutor or
police. Nor would it show the required intent to deny the accused the equal
protection of the laws. "Subsection (2) [of section 1980] requires, inter alia,
that the conspiracy to impede justice be with the purposeful intent to deny a
citizen the equal protection of the laws."3 6 It has been held that a conspiracy
to violate due process will not suffice. 7 One final obstacle to this theory is that
most courts have held that the common law immunity of judges and prosecutors
is left intact by these statutes."
III. The Need For a Civil Remedy
A. The Individual Defendant
Among the recently suggested solutions to the "free press v. fair trial" conflict, a civil remedy stands as a somewhat novel proposal. One reason may be
that the impact of many of these remedies on the individual criminal defendant
has been overlooked. New trials, mistrials, changes of venue, and continuances
are recognized as means for protecting the fairness and integrity of the judicial
process. Yet it is the defendant himself who must bear much of the substantial
and extra expense involved in the use of these remedies. When it is prejudicial
publicity that necessitates the use of these procedural safeguards, it is an unjustly misplaced financial burden to require the defendant to pay for their use.
32 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
33 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754 (1966).
34 Ibid.
35 Id. at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Significantly,
six members of the Court agreed that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress
to pass laws aimed at private conspiracies. Id. at 782. As regards the actual construction
of § 241, it is not clear whether Justice Clark's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Black
and Fortas, would require state action to be present in any action brought under the statute,
Id. at 761-62.
36 Lombardi v. Peace, 259 F. Supp. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
37 Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1955); Dunn v. Gazzola, 216
F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1954).
38 For a list of cases holding that the Civil Rights Statutes do not abrogate the traditional
principles of immunity, see Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 659 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd,
316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the
Ciuil Rights Acts, 68 HAv. L. Rv.1229 (1955).
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Judge Meyer, quoted previously, made the following point concerning the shortcomings of reversal as a solution to the problem.
[B]ut for a number of reasons reversal is not an adequate corrective. Cardinal among those reasons is that all of the expenses of the abortive trial
and of the appeal necessary to upset it must be borne by the litigant or
the accused, and in cases likely to attract substantial publicity, such expenses
are apt to be in the tens of thousands of dollars.39
This reasoning can certainly be validly applied to the expenses of a new trial
and in a lesser, but significant degree, to the sums spent in moving witnesses and
attorneys to another venue or in postponing the trial for an indefinite period.
A recent report by the American Bar Association reveals that the average lawyer
charges $150 per day spent in court and $20 an hour spent in preparation."
Considering the months of preparation and weeks of trial attending most significant criminal cases, Judge Meyer's "tens of thousands of dollars" is by no
means an extravagant estimate. It is truly an anomaly in the existing law that
the defendant should bear these expenses in situations where the news media
are responsible for resort to these remedies. Mr. Bailey has stated the argument:
"Let the courts be highly sensitive to prejudicial publicity from obvious abuse
[and] poor judgment. Let the courts protect the defendants, grant mistrials
[and] continuances such as may be necessary, and let the press, for its abuses,
pay the bill."' 41
Nor should it make any difference that the defendant was actually found
guilty of the crime charged. His factual guilt does not give the news media
any more of a right to necessitate the defendant's going through two trials
instead of one.
The need in this situation for imposing upon the press the duty of reimbursing the defendant for these additional expenditures has not gone completely unrecognized. The American Bar Association's recent proposals include
the following recommendation.
4.2 Reimbursement of defendant.
In the event that a mistrial or change of venue is granted or a conviction set aside, as a result of an extrajudicial statement held to be in
contempt of court, it is recommended that the court have the authority
to require that all or part of the proceeds of any fine be used to reimburse
the defendant for the additional legal fees and other expenses fairly attributable to the order that
the case be tried in a different venue or tried
42
again in the same venue.
This solution might be ideal if its exercise were not dependent on the use of the
contempt power. The problem lies in the questionable constitutionality of sec-

39

Meyer, supra note 12, at 17.

40 ABA

STANDING COMM. ON ECONOMICS Or LAW PRACTICE, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Or
RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FEES FOR SELECTED LEGAL SERVICES 4 (1966).

41

Seminar, supra note 2, at 163.

42 ABA

ADVISORY CoMm. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS,

STANDARDS

RELATING TO

FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 15 (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited as ABA REP.].
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tion 4.1 which authorizes the limited use of such power against the news media. 3
At the Notre Dame Law School Symposium on Free Press And Fair Trial, Mr.
John de J. Pemberton, Jr., the executive director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, argued that section 4.1 would definitely carve a new exception out of
the first amendment protections." The rule has been well established in a line
of cases beginning with Bridges v. California" that a newspaper may not be
held in contempt of court unless its out-of-court publication presents a "clear
and present danger" to the administration of justice. The Court has yet to find
a publication presenting such a clear and present danger or to apply the test
to a case involving a jury trial.
The draftsmen of sections 4.1 and 4.2 definitely have attempted to bring
these sections within the purview of the clear and present danger test. While
Mr. Pemberton would argue that they have not succeeded, it is apparent that
their attempt to do so has seriously limited the practical value of these sections.
Both the language of section 4.1 and the accompanying commentary illustrate
that this section is designed to reach only prejudicial publicity published during
the trial.4 6 Also, a reckless or actual intent to "affect the outcome" of the trial
would have to be shown." Indeed, the commentary recognizes that "such statements would not, of course, be common, but when they did occur, they would be
worthy of punishment."4 8 But even with such limitations, section 4.2 stands as
strong evidence of the need for placing the burden of these extra expenses upon
the press rather than the defendant. The commentary accompanying section 4.2
is even more to the point.
In such instances, [mistrial, reversal] it will normally be necessary to retry
the case, and the defendant (or whoever is bearing the cost of the defense)
may incur substantial additional expenses attributable to the necessity for
an additional trial. When this does occur, it seems only just that the
43 Section 4.1 provides in pertinent part:
The use of the contempt power against persons who disseminate information
by means of public communication . . . can in certain circumstances raise grave
constitutional questions .... It is therefore recommended that the contempt power

should be used only with considerable caution but should be exercised in at least
the following instances ....

(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in progress
or that a jury is being selected for such a trial:
'(i)disseminates by any means of public communication an extrajudicial statement relating to the defendant or to the issues in the case that goes
beyond the public record of the court in the case, if the statement is reasonably
calculated to affect the outcome of the trial and seriously threatens to have such
an effect; or
(ii) makes such a statement with the expectation that it will be so
disseminated.
(b) Against a person who knowingly violates a valid judicial order not to
disseminate until completion of the trial or disposition without trial, specified information referred to in the course of a judicial hearing from which the public is
excluded under semtions 3.1 or 3.5(d) of these recommendations.
44 Pemberton, Constitutional Problems in Restraint on the Media, 42 NOTRE DAME.
LAWYER 881, 884-85 (1967).
45 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Accord, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 *(1962); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
46

ABA REP. 151.

47
48

Id. at 152.
Ibid.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Symposium, 1967]

person responsible
for these additional expenses be required to reimburse
49
the defendant.

B. The Necessity of an Effective Sanction
A statute allowing individual criminal defendants to bring an action against
the news media for the price of a second trial, change of venue, or continuance
would provide just compensation for the accused. In addition, such legislation
would provide an effective, yet constitutional, sanction against the media itself.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell" did not advocate
any sanctions against the "recalcitrant" press, although the question was expressly
left open." The Court outlined three steps that the trial judge should have
taken to insure that Sheppard received a fair trial. First, he should have exercised more control over the activities of the reporters in the courtroom. Secondly, he should have taken steps to insulate the witnesses from the prejudicial
influences surrounding the trial. Finally, he should have made a strong effort
to control the release of leads,
information, and gossip by the police, witnesses,
52
and counsel for both sides.
Improving courtroom demeanor and insulating the witnesses is sound policy
for any trial court, but neither will have much effect on prejudicial pretrial or
trial publicity. Controlling the divulgence of information to the press by those
persons within the trial court's control is, however, a more serious attempt to
eradicate prejudicial publicity. This third mandate from the Sheppard Court
obviously played a large role in forming the American Bar Association's recommendations. With the exception of sections 4.1 and 4.2, none of the American
Bar Association's proposals are aimed at the press itself. Rather, lawyers, police,
jurors, witnesses, and court officers are forbidden, under threat of contempt, to
divulge certain types of prejudicial material to the press.5
These recommendations are quite sensible, but it seems unrealistic to consider them an ultimate solution to the problem. As the proposals now stand,
any information that can be culled from sources outside of the trial court's
control may be published. Past criminal records can be compiled from the newspaper's own files. Statements and other damaging evidence concerning the
accused can be obtained from friends and relatives not subpoenaed as witnesses.
No doubt these recommendations would make the press work much harder
for their information, but the plain fact is that they could still obtain most of
it. Dr. Frank Stanton, President of the Columbia Broadcasting System, had
this to say about the effectiveness of the American Bar Association recommendations:
Strictures leading to wide contempt threats would drive information
underground, but there will be information -from
anonymous sources,
from leaks, from backdoor handouts, from payoff agreements. All that
sweeping and inclusive use of the contempt charge can achieve, no matter
49

Id. at 154.

50 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
51 Id. at 358.
52 Id. at 358-59.
53 ABA REP. §§ 1-2, at 2-8. For other attempts to solve this problem in a similar
manner, see 28 O.F.R. § 50.2 (1967) (divulgence of certain information by Justice Department personnel forbidden); S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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how much caution is urged, is to promote unaccountability -the assurance
by the press that the police, prosecutor, or defense attorney will never be
revealed as the source of information.54
It should also be noted that ten states have statutes granting newsmen the
privilege of not revealing their sources of information." It has already been
pointed out that the American Bar Association committee did realize that something more was needed- a sanction that would reach the press itself. Unfortunately, they chose the limited and troublesome contempt power.56
Beyond the instructions to the trial court, the Sheppard Court also gave a
strong vote of approval to the use of the continuance and change of venue. "But
where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates,
or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity.""7 For years,
commentators have criticized the inability of these procedural remedies, including mistrials and reversals, to insulate criminal trials effectively from the effects
of harnful publicity." The main criticism leveled at these remedies is that they
in no way deter the press from continuing to publish harmful and prejudicial
information. District Judge Hubert Will has written:
[W]hen a conviction is reversed for reasons of publicity, it has no effect
whatsoever as a sanction against the press, and there is consequently nothing
in the reversal which prevents prejudicialpress treatment of the case before
or during any retrial or similar treatment of future trials of other defendants.5" (Emphasis added.)
Even in Sheppard the Court remarked that "reversals are but palliatives." 60
Legislation, allowing defendants to sue the press for the additional expense of
these procedural devices, would enable these remedies to have the needed deterrent effect on the press itself. No unwritten law compels a newspaper to
print all the information that it receives. If an editor sees an article that appears
to be libelous under the existing law, he will ordinarily delete it. It might sell
more newspapers if printed, but it would also expose the paper to the threat
of a serious damage suit. At present, there is no necessity for editors to have a
similar concern about publishing information likely to be harmful to the accused
in a criminal case. The model statute proposed in the next section would allow
prejudicial materials to be accompanied by the same threat of a damage suit
and thereby lead to the deletion of such information before publication.
It can be argued that the full deterrent potential of such a statute could
never be realized until both state and federal courts reassess their policy of
reluctantly and infrequently granting new trials, changes of venue, or even con54 Stanton, Justice and the News Media, Trial, Dec.-Jan. 1966-67, pp. 40, 41.
55 For a list of those states having such statutes, see Comment, The Case Against Trial
by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217, 246 '(1962).
56 See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
57 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
58 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 12, at 17-19; Trescher, A Bar Association View, 11 VILL.
L. R~v. 709, 710-11 (1966); Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAUL L. Rav. 197, 209211 (1963); Comment, supra note 55, at 235.
59 Will, supra note 58, at 210.
60 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, (1966).
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tinuances. Mainly responsible for this attitude is the requirement of many
courts that the defendant make a showing of actual prejudice at his trial before
one of these remedies is granted. Making this burden almost impossible is the
great weight these same courts give to the jurors' declarations of impartiality
at the voir dire.6 ' Recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that a showing
of actual prejudice will no longer be necessary.
In Marshall v. United States,2 the Court, acting under its supervisory
power, reversed the federal conviction of an unlicensed drug seller. Two accounts
of the defendant's previous felony convictions had appeared in the newspapers.
Seven of the jurors admitted seeing at least one of the articles, but each juror
assured the trial judge that it would not influence his verdict. While reversing,
the Court noted that evidence too prejudicial for admission at trial will not be
any less prejudicial if it reaches the jury through a news account. 3
Four years later, in Rideau v. Louisiana..4 the Court gave strong indication that the federal standard, set out in Marshall,may also be the constitutional
standard applicable to state courts. The publicity causing a reversal of Rideau's
state court conviction was extremely prejudicial since the accused's inadmissible
confession had been televised. But as the dissent strongly pointed out, there
was no showing of actual prejudice from which to infer that the appellant's
trial was a "meaningless formality." 8 In two cases following Rideau, the Court
overturned state court convictions in analogous factual situations without requiring any showing of actual prejudice 6 Finally, in Sheppard, no showing of
actual prejudice was ever offered or required.
A change of venue or a continuance contains the additional difficulty of
being completely within the discretion of the trial judge. Hence, reviewing courts
are loath to reverse a conviction for his failure to afford these remedies.6 7 Hopefully, the Court's admonition, in Sheppard, to employ these remedies "where
there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial'"s will make these remedies much more available to future criminal
defendants.
61 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Nash, 313 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963);
United States ex tel. Brown v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596, 602-04 '(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 959 (1963) (habeas corpus petition from state court conviction); Torrance v.
Salzinger, 297 F.2d 902, 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 887 (1962) (habeas corpus
petition from state court conviction). For a list of additional cases, see Annot., 10 L. ED.
2d 1243, 1265 (1964).
62 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
63 Id. at 312-13.
64 373 U.S. 723 '(1963).
65 Id. at 729 (dissenting opinion).
66 In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, (1965), the Court reversed the appellant's conviction
in a trial that was filmed by television cameras present in the courtroom at all times. The
Court made explicit reference to the fact that a showing of actual prejudice was not necessary.
Id. at 543. In Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), the Court reversed appellant's
conviction where the prosecution's main witness was the deputy sheriff who was also in
charge of the sequestered jury. No actual prejudice was shown.
67 See, e.g., Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 907 (1963);
Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 922
(1964); Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810, 817 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); Natvig v. United States, 236 F.2d 694, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1014 (1957).
68 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
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IV. The Solution -A

Statutory Remedy

A. Precedent
Only one state has ever enacted legislation granting a civil remedy against
the press to a person injured by prejudicial publicity during his trial. In 1836
the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the following statute:
Liability of Person Making Publication
If any such publication shall improperly tend to bias the minds of
the public, or of the court, the officers, jurors, witnesses or any of them,
on a question depending before the court, it shall be lawful for any person
who shall feel himself aggrieved thereby to proceed against the author,
printer and publisher thereof, or either of them, by indictment, or he may
bring an action at law against them, or either of them, and recover such
damages as a jury may think fit to award. 69
This statute seems to provide the "person aggrieved" with much more than
expenses incurred in a second trial, change of venue, or a continuance. But it
also seems limited to publicity appearing only during the time the trial was
"pending." Unhappily, all comment about this statute is severely limited by
the fact that there has not been a single reported civil action brought under it!
The two Pennsylvania criminal cases which do consider the meaning of the
statute confuse more than clarify it. In a case soon after the statute's enactment,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that a single party could be subjected
to both civil and criminal liability for a certain publication." In the course of
the opinion, the court construed the statute in such a way as to indicate that
the prejudicial publicity would have to be both libelous and in contempt of
court before any liability attached.
The entire scope of the revised act shows that [its] purpose was no more
than to regulate the trial and punishment of contempt . . . for a libel
would not be protected by the Statute unless it were not only a reflection
71
on a minister of justice, but also a contempt of court in a pending cause.
On the other hand, a more recent criminal case gave the statute a much
broader interpretation.
It is not necessary to aver that the acts complained of did actually
influence the disposition of the cause or interfere with the administration
of justice .... Nor need it be stated that the minds of any of the classes
stated were actually biased thereby, because the offense
is complete upon
72
proof of an improper tendency to bias any of them.
By doing away with the necessity of showing any actual damage, this construction
would place the constitutionality of the statute in serious jeopardy." 1 The
Pennsylvania statute, however, does serve to illustrate some of the drafting
errors to be avoided if a civil statutory remedy is to be effective.
69 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2045 '(1962).
70 Foster v. Commonwealth, 8 W. & S. 77 (Pa. 1844).
71 Id. at 82.
72 Commonwealth v. Conroy, 69 Pittsb. Leg. J. (o.s.) 373, 375 (Quart. Sess. Clearfield
County 1920).
73 See 27 Tzmp. L.Q. 490, 492 (1954).
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B. A Model Statute
An Act to enable criminal defendants to recover the expenses and attorney's
fees from those responsible for prejudicial publicity resulting in a new trial,
change of venue, or continuance.
Section 1. Prejudicial Publicity Defined
As used in this Act, prejudicial publicity means the dissemination by any
newspaper, magazine, radio station, television station, or other news agency
of any of the following matter:
1. the accused's prior criminal record or prior arrests;
2. the existence or content of any confession, admission, or other statement
made by the accused;
3. the performance, results, or both, of any tests taken by the accused;
4. the identity or credibility of any of the witnesses or any statements made
by them;
5. the possibility that the accused might plead guilty to a lesser offense; or
6. any other statement, editorial, or evidence intimating that the accused committed the crime for which he is or will be on trial.
Section 2. Recovery of the Additional Expenses of a Change of Venue
or a Continuance
Whenever a trial court in a criminal case, either on its own motion or the
motion of the accused, grants the accused a change of venue or a continuance
on the ground that jurors or potential jurors have been or may have been
prejudiced against the accused by reason of the prejudicial publicity appearing
between the time of the accused's arrest and the granting of the motion, the
accused, or whoever is paying the accused's expenses, may bring an action at
law for damages against any person responsible for such prejudicial publicity.
In this action such damages shall consist of all the additional expenses and
attorney's fees sustained by the accused in moving to another venue or postponing the trial, as well as the expenses and attorney's fees sustained in bringing
an action under this section.
Section 3. Recovery of the Additional Expenses of a New Trial
Whenever a trial court in a criminal case declares a mistrial, or either the
trial court or an appellate court sets aside a criminal conviction and grants the
accused a new trial, on the ground that jurors or potential jurors have been or
may have been prejudiced against the accused by reason of the prejudicial
publicity appearing between the time of the accused's arrest and the granting
of a mistrial or the original conviction, the accused, or whoever is paying the
accused's expenses, may bring an action at law against any person responsible
for such prejudicial publicity. In this action such damages shall consist of all
the additional expenses and attorney's fees sustained by the accused at the second
trial, as well as the expenses and attorney's fees sustained in bringing an action
under this section.
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Section 4. The Court in the Criminal Proceeding To Make the Grounds for
Its Action a Matter of Record
Any court granting a new trial, mistrial, change of venue, or continuance
on grounds of prejudicial publicity, as defined by this Act, shall make such
grounds a matter of record. Such record may then be introduced as evidence
in any suit brought under this Act.
Section 5. No Liability for Publishing Matter Divulged in Open Court
Before the Jury
No person shall be found liable for damages under this Act for disseminating any information disclosed in an open court in the presence of the jury.
Section 6. Amending Any Statute Declaring Prisoners To Be Civilly Dead
Any statute currently in force which declares that prisoners and inmates
of city, county, or state prisons are civilly dead for the period of their incarceration is hereby amended to allow any such prisoner or inmate to bring a
suit under this Act.
Section 7. Statute Meant to Grant Only a Civil Remedy
This Act is meant to grant only a civil remedy to individual criminal defendants who have been put to the extra expenses enumerated by sections 2 and
3 of this Act. It is not meant to expand the existing grounds on which a new
trial, mistrial, change of venue, or a continuance may be obtained.
C. Avoiding the ConstitutionalProblems
Direct restraints on what the news media can disseminate to the public is
dangerously close to the abridgment of speech and press forbidden by the first
amendment. It has already been pointed out that the Supreme Court will allow
the use of the contempt power to exercise such a restraint only if the publication comes within the limits of the "clear and present danger" test. 4 Those
who propose criminal statutes making the publication of certain prejudicial
matters a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, have included
only matter that is most likely to be highly prejudicial in most circumstances.75
There is also the danger that any criminal statute containing a severe enough
punishment to make it effective would be struck down as a prior restraint.7
The model statute avoids these constitutional difficulties in that it is not
a direct restraint on the press at all. If this statute were enacted, a newspaper
would still be free to lawfully publish any type of information concerning the
accused. Only if the disseminated material was shown to be responsible for
the use of the remedies set out in sections 2 and 3 of the Act, could the press
be held liable for the defendant's expenses. This is not to say that a civil action
can never infringe upon a newspaper's first amendment rights. New York Times
74 See note 45 supra.
75 See Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed - A Study of PrejudicialNews Reporting in
Criminal Cases, 56 J. Ciu. L., C. & P.S. 158, 166-68 (1965); Meyer, Free Press v. Fair
Trial: The judge's View, 41 N.D.L. REv. 14, 22 '(1964).
76 GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAro TAL 191 (1966).
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Co. v. Sullivan7" and Time Inc. v. Hill" have conclusively determined otherwise."
However the very nature of the rights involved in the "free press v. fair trial"
controversy, serves to distinguish these two cases from the model statute. Neither
a public official's right to his reputation nor a family's right to quiet a sensational incident in their lives approach the stature of the sixth amendment rights
embodied in the express grant that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed ... ."" No such constitutional language guarantees
the rights sought to be protected in Sullivan and Hill. They are vague and pale
in comparison.
V. Conclusion
No one solution can solve every problem to be found in the "free press v.
fair trial" debate. For example, this statute would only afford token relief to
Sam Sheppard for the ten years he spent in jail. But this legislation would make
new trial,
the press liable for that which they are principally responsible -the
change of venue, or continuance. Moreover, enactment of this statute, plus
a widespread adoption of the liberal requirements laid down by the Supreme
Court for the use of these traditional procedural remedies, would breathe new
life into them and make them effective combatants against prejudicial publicity.
Hugh C. Griffln
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376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
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